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In addition, state law gives him the right to state-court review of the committee's decision. The trial court rejected his claim that the failure to provide a judicial hearing before the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The treating physician then sought to medicate respondent over his objections, pursuant to SOC Policy 600.30. If the committee determines by a majority vote that the inmate suffers from a mental disorder and is gravely disabled or dangerous, the inmate may be medicated against his will, provided the psychiatrist is in the majority. In this case, respondent was absent when members of the Center staff met with the committee before the hearing. The Policy under review requires the State to establish, by a medical finding, that a mental disorder exists which is likely to cause harm if not treated. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. Most of that time, respondent was housed in the prison's mental health unit, where he consented to the administration of antipsychotic drugs. At the Center, psychiatrists first diagnosed respondent as suffering from a manic-depressive disorder. First, if a psychiatrist determines that an inmate should be treated with antipsychotic drugs but the inmate does not consent, the inmate may be subjected to involuntary treatment with the drugs only if he (1) suffers from a "mental disorder" and (2) is "gravely disabled" or poses a "likelihood of serious harm" to himself, others, or their property. Fourth, after the initial hearing, involuntary medication can continue only with periodic review. Antipsychotic drugs, sometimes called "neuroleptics" or "psychotropic drugs," are medications commonly used in treating mental disorders such as schizophrenia. At first, respondent gave voluntary consent to treatment, including the administration of antipsychotic medications. Only a psychiatrist may order or approve the medication. When respondent first refused medication, a committee, again composed of a nontreating psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the Center's Associate Superintendent, was required to review an inmate's case after the first seven days of treatment. Upon full consideration of the state administrative scheme, however, we find that the Due Process Clause confers upon respondent no greater right than that recognized under state law. This sufficiently overcomes the claim of mootness in the circumstances of the case and under our precedents. The court, however, did more than establishjudicial procedures for making the factual determinations called for by Policy 600.30. Ed.2d 675 (1983), we held that Pennsylvania had created a protected liberty interest on the part of prison inmates to avoid administrative segregation by enacting regulations that "used language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or 'must' be employed, and that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicatesviz., 'the need for control,' or 'the threat of a serious disturbance.' " Id., at 471-472, 103 S. It required that a different set of determinations than those set forth in the Policy be made as a precondition to medication without the inmate's consent.